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THE GEOGRAPHY OF INJUSTICE:
BORDERS AND THE CONTINUING IMMISERATION OF CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN ERA OF 'FREE TRADE'
Don M. Mitchell'
"The Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, whose reputation does not
rest on cheap sentiment, has said that migrant labor allowed America's economy to
grow faster, with less inflation, in the 1990's."'
"You have industries in the United States saying, "Look, we really depend on the use
of these people we used to call illegal immigrants,"' said United States ambassador to
Mexico, Jeffrey Davidow. 'We cannot really run the hotel industry in Las Vegas
without them. Agriculture in California would be lost if it weren't for them."' 2
"So it is not only the free movement of goods and capital that makes an economy sing;
maybe it is the free movement of labor, too. Migration's tides 'respond to deep
underlying economic incentives, are all but impossible to stop, and must instead be
regulated,' [Mexican] President Fox told the United States Congress." 3
L Introduction
Why is it that when the reigning ideology governing the expansion of "free
trade" is anti-regulatory, all agree that the movement of people, or rather laborers,
must be carefully regulated? Indeed, why are borders strengthened for people just as
states of the Western Hemisphere embark on a thorough reconfiguration, and even a
dismantling, of borders for capital and goods?4
The same year that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came
into affect, the U.S. implemented Operation Gatekeeper, its most stringent program for
fortifying the border to date. The question remains, though, will the expansion of
NAFTA into the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas slow, in either the short run
or the long run, the border fortification, of which Gatekeeper is such a stark example?
The answer is probably not. Rather, the expansion provides the conditions that will
"Don M. Mitchell is an Associate Professor of Geography in the Maxwell School of
Public Affairs at Syracuse University, where he serves as the Director of the People's
Geography Project. He received a MacArthur Fellowship in 1998, is the North
American Editor of the journal ECUMENE, and an Associate Editor of the JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY AND GEOGRAPHY. He has written and lectured extensively in the area of
cultural geography, with a special emphasis on the effects of globalization on working
people, especially migratory laborers.
'Tim Weiner, In a World at Flood Tide, An Effort to Lift the Gate a Bit, N.Y. TMES,
Sept. 9, 2001, at 4.4.
2/d. at 4.1.
31d. at 4.4.
4 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the answer to this question may seem
obvious. But the increased security along U.S. borders that those attacks are leading
to post date by a considerable extent the earlier militarization of the border addressed
in this essay.
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make continued fortification necessary. This essay will explain why and how such a
"free trade"-induced fortification will lead to the continuing immiseration or
impoverishment of the very people the U.S. Ambassador says are necessary to our
economy, California farm workers.
From the beginning, California agriculture has been a "globalized" enterprise.
An export model served in part as a foundation for the Spanish and Mexican colonial
rancho system. This export model intensified during the global wheat boom of the
1860s and again in the 1890s with California's transformation into fruit and specialty
vegetable empire.' The dual process of a fairly crude "primitive accumulation" and the
cultivation of a large, transient, highly pauperized, and non-local workforce provided
the basis for the development of export crops in California to both Eastern cities and
overseas. The term, "Primitive accumulation" has its roots in Marxian theory to denote
the often violent process of disposing peasants and indigenous peoples from the land.
The process encompasses a tearing asunder of established social relationships and
their replacement with a regime of modem private property, trade in goods and labor,
and capitalist social relations in general.6 Towards the end of the first volume of
Capital, Marx could easily have been writing about California when he described
"primitive accumulation" as:
The spoliation of the church's property, the fraudulent alienation of
the State domains, the robbery of the common lands, the usurpation
of feudal and clan property, and its transformation into modern
private property under circumstances of reckless terrorism, were just
so many of the idyllic methods of primitive accumulation.7
Indeed, Marx wrote to his American correspondent, Friedrich Sorge, in 1880, "1 should
be very much pleased if you could find me something good (meaty) on economic
conditions in California. California is very important to me because nowhere else has
the upheaval most shamelessly caused by capitalist centralization taken place with
such speed."'
The bloody history ofthe process of"primitive accumulation," centralization,
and intensification of agriculture in California is extensively documented, and
extensively criticized. Perhaps the most famous criticisms are those of Henry George
in the 1870s and Cary McWilliams in the 1930s.9 Each showed, and historians such as
Cletus Daniel have made clear, that the progressive development of capitalist relations
5 See, e.g. C.ETUSDANIEL, BrrrERHARvEST: A HISTORY OF CALIFORNiAFARMwORKERs, 1870-
1941 (1981); see also DAVID IGLER, INDUSTRIAL COWBOYS: MILLER AND LUX AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THEFAR WEST, 1850-1920 (2001); CAREY MCWILLAMS, FACTORIES IN
THE FIELD(1971); KEVIN STARR, AMERICANS AND THECALIFORNIA DREAM, 1850-1915 (1973);
KEVIN STARR, INVENTING THEDREAM: CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1985);
STEVEN STOLL, THEFRUITS OF NATURALA DVANTAGE: MAKING THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRYSIDE
IN CALIFORNA(1998); Richard Walker, California's Golden Road to Riches: Natural
Resources and Regional Capitalism, 1848-1940, 91 ANNALS ASSN AM. GEOGRAPHERS
167 (2001).
6KARL MARX, Capital (Vol. 1) 667-670 (1987 ed.).
7 Id. at 685.
8 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 56.
9 See HENRY GEORGE, OUR LAND ANDLAND POLICY (1871); see also McWilliams, supra
note 5.
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in California brought with it a continuing impoverishment, or iminiseration, of
agricultural workers, both in absolute and in relative terms. This immiseration is not
despite California's "globalization" but because of it.0 At the same time, the continued
immiseration of agricultural workers in California is a necessary pre-condition of
California's on-going integration into global markets and global food production
systems. As the economist Varden Fuller showed in 1930, the assumption of continual
and ever-cheapening labor served as the basis for capitalization of California farms."
To fulfill this assumption, and to compete in global markets, California agriculturalists
have had to scour the globe for labor and to continually induce a labor over-supply in
the fields.'2 This process has only intensified in recent years. The conclusion to be
made is that California agriculture's global ambition, a precondition of which is its
procurement of a foreign labor over-supply, is dependent on strong borders, and not
weak borders, at least for workers. 3
1IL Globalization: Nothing New, Everything New
This essay began by saying that California agriculture has always been a
global enterprise. But such a statement hides as much as it reveals. It avoids the
question: What is meant by global? Or, more accurately, what is meant by
globalization? This is the question that geographer Neil Smith asks in a compelling
argument about what he calls the "restructuring of spatial scale.' 4 As Smith notes,
'0 DANIEL, supra note 5.
11 The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm
Organization in California: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 266 Before the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 19777, Ex. 8762-A (1940)
(statement of Varden Fuller, economist).
12 See, e.g, DANIEL, supra note 5; see also DON MITCHELL, THE LIE OFTHELAND: MIGRANT
W ORKERS AND THE CALIFORNIA LANDSCAPE (1996).
13 See, e.g., PETERANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THEU.S.-M EXICO DIVIDE (2000); see
also JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE wILLEGAL ALLEN' AND THE
REMAKING OF THE U.S.-MExiCo BOUNDARY (2001).
34 Neil Smith, The Restructuring of Spatial Scale and the New Global Geography of
Uneven Development, 52 JINBUN CHIRIGAKA (HUMAN GEOGRAPHY) 51 (2000) (expositing
Smith's ideas in a particularly cogent manner); see also Neil Smith, Afterword, UNEVEN
DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL, NATURE AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (2d ed. 1990); see also Neil
Smith, Contours of a Spatialized Politics: Homeless Vehicles and the Production of
Geographical Scale, 33 Soc TEXr54 (1992); see also Neil Smith, Satanic Geographies
of Globalization, 10 PuB. CULTURE 169 (1997) (extensive theoretical work now exists on
geographical scale in geography). Cf SPACES OF(OBALIZATlON: REASSERTING THE POWER
OF THE LOCAL (Kevin Cox ed., 1997); Kevin Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of
Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking for Local Politics, 17 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 1 (1997); Andrew J. Herod, The Production of Scale in United States
Labour Relations, 23 AREA 82 (1991); Andrew J. Herod, Labor's Spatial Praxis and the
Geography of Contract Bargaining in the U.S. East Coast Longshore Industry, 1953-
1989, 17 PoL. GEOGRAPHY 145 (1997); Sallie Marston, The Social Construction of Scale,
24 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 219 (2000); Erik Swyngedouw, Neither Global nor
Local: Globalization and the Politics of Scale, in SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION:
REASSERTING THEPOWER OF THELOCAL supra.. See generally Donald M. Mitchell, The
2001]
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some aspects of globalization are not particularly new: "A world market in commodity
capital extraction and exchange was largely in place by the nineteenth century.""5
Such a world market was pretty much assumed in the theories of Adam Smith and Karl
Marx. Even so, this world market is not geographically "replete," and other economic
forms continue to exist in the "interstices."'6 By contrast, a world market in finance
capital only developed from the upheavals of the global depressions of the 1920s and
1930s, and it was only institutionalized after World War 11 with the development of
such "Bretton Woods" organizations as the World Bank and the IMF.17 Finally, a
global market in production capital did not truly develop until after the economic
restructurings of the 1970s when new production strategies led to forms of competitive
production that "simply outgrew the national markets" and new distribution systems
allowed for production to move out of existing industrial regions s
This last development has brought with it a significant transformation in the
global spatial division of labor.1 9 As Smith notes, "the period since the late 1970s has
witnessed an unparalleled global movement of labor, the wages of which are also a part
of production capital."20 That is to say, the globalization of production capital - which,
as important as the restructuring of global financial and commodity capital may be, is
the driving force behind the current wave of globalization and has brought with it an
unprecedented labor migration.
NAFTA and now the FTAA, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
that led to the development of the World Trade Organization, are best understood as
a means for writing the rules of economic cooperation and competition for these
different markets at a scale larger than the nation-state. But they all do so with the
explicit goal of maintaining, rather than undermining, the forms of economic inequality
- the geography of injustice - that make such markets possible.
The story is simple. As stated before, California already relied on a global
labor force long before the upheavals of the current period. Therefore the story of
progressive globalization, needs to be placed within a story about uneven capitalist
development and the constant restructuring of geographical scale.2' Geographical
Scales of Justice: Localist Ideology, Large-Scale Production, and Agricultural
Labor's Geography of Resistance in 1930s California, in ORGANIZING THELANDSCAPE:
GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ONLABORUNIONSM 159 (Andrew J. Herod ed., 1998).
15 Smith, The Restructuring of Spatial Scale and the New Global Geography of
Uneven Development, supra note 14, at 52.
16 Id.
17 Id.
Is Id.
19 See, e.g., DOREEN MASSEY, SPATIAL DIVISIONS OF LABOR SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND THE
GEOGRAPHY OF PRODUCTION (1984); A NDREW SAYER & RICIHARD WALKER, THE NEW SOCIAL
ECONOMY: REWORKING THE DivISION OF LABOR (1992); Kevin R. Coy, The Politics of
Globalization: A Skeptic's View, 11 POL. GEOGRAPHY 428 (1992).
21 Smith, The Restructuring of Spatial Scale and the New Global Geography of
Uneven Development, supra note 14, at 53.
21 See SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL, supra note 14;
see also Herod, The Production of Scale in United States Labour Relations, supra
note 14, at 82; see also Smith, The Restructuring of Spatial Scale and the New Global
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scale refers to the extent or range at which particular processes and relationships are
bounded. We are all used to thinking in terms of scale. For example, there are local,
regional, national and global scales. What is harder to grasp is that these scales, and
the relationships between them, are continually being restructured through economic,
social, political and cultural processes and contestations. Geographical scale, in
political economic terms, is a means of bounding and adjudicating rules and relations
of capitalist competition and cooperation of sameness and difference. In other words,
one of the on-going questions facing the managers of capitalism is how to balance the
competing and contradictory tendencies within capitalism, on the one hand, a drive
towards equalization. That is, the tendency towards the equalization of profit rates
and wages as well as the processes that are usually identified as the homogenizing
forces of globalization - and on the other hand, a drive toward (and need for)
differentiation.'
Over the course of the long development of contemporary capitalism, the
national scale has been the most obvious result of this contradiction. 23 The
institutional structures and borders of the contemporary nation-state developed and
were entrenched as a means of bounding a scale of capitalist competition within a
framework of cooperation.24 Of course, the nation-state has developed for a whole host
of other reasons such as the instillation of loyalty to a central authority, the
monopolization of legitimate violence over a territory, the competitive desire for
colonial supremacy, the institutionalization and purification of national identity, etc.25
But what is interesting is the ways that, at least when seen from the perspective of the
political economy, these other reasons for nation-state development establish a series
of problems that the capitalist economy must either negotiate or find ways to take
advantage of.26
At smaller scales within the nation-state, processes of equalization and
differentiation are also continually negotiated, as any glance at an American
metropolitan region, with its radically uneven geography of wealth and poverty, of
investment and disinvestment, makes clear.27 Like the nation-state, the "urban" as a
Geography of Uneven Development, supra note 14, at 51; see also Smith, The Satanic
Geographies of Globalization: Uneven Development in the 1990s, supra note 14.
22 See generally DAVID HARVEY, THE LIMITS ToCAPITAL (1982); DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF
CAPITAL: TOWARDS ACRITICAL GEOGRAPHY (2001); Smith, The Restructuring of Spatial
Scale and the New Global Geography of Uneven Development, supra note 14.
23 Smith, The Restructuring of Spatial Scale and the New Global Geography of
Uneven Development, supra note 14, at 142-47.
24 id.
25 See, e.g., BENEDICTANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND
SPREAD OFNATIONALISM (1991); BECOMING NATIONAL: A READER (Geoff Eley & Ronald G.
Suny eds., 1996); ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY (1991).
26 See George Henderson, CALIFORNIA AND THE FICTIONS OF CAPITAL 28 (1999) (for an
excellent argument on seeing capitalism as a series of (structured) problems that
individual capitalists need to overcome).
27 See, e.g., NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST
CITY (1996); Smith, The Restructuring of Spatial Scale and the New Global Geography
of Uneven Development, supra note 14.
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scale is a means for adjudicating the drive for equalization and differentiation28 So too
is the sub-national region (consider the degree to which"the South" or "the West" are
coherent entities,29 and consider the sheer volume of difference that these entities
contain).
The current wave of globalization (that is, the need to develop global markets
in production capital and to write new rules for global finance capital) as it is embodied
within institutions like the World Bank and trade agreements like the FTAA, especially
when examined in the light of the development of the EU or ASEAN, can, in these
terms, be read as a means to write the rules of capitalist cooperation and competition
at the supra-regional and global scales.30 For technological reasons and because of
capitalisnls inherent need to continue to grow, the scale of the nation-state has
become less than optimum for adjudicating cooperation and competition of productive
and financial capital. The development of these global markets requires not a complete
transcendence of local and regional labor markets, as President Vicente Fox suggests,
but rather their reinforcement.3
To see why this is the case, it is necessary to understand globalization as a
process not just of expansion of markets, but of on-going, uneven geographical
development. This analysis requires addressing the question of why dfference is both
so necessary and so persistent in the global economy, despite all forces tending
toward homogenization.32 Put more crudely, why will a rising tide of trade not lift all
boats? The answer to this question comes from two related arguments. The first
concerns the nature of capital accumulation, and the second argument centers on the
notion of social reproduction.
The accumulation of capital, of course, is the very reason for capitalism. 33
While this drive toward continual accumulation gives birth to a wide spectrum of
obstacles and contradictions, - significantly the constant tendency toward the type
of over-accumulation that was so central to the Depression of the 1930s - the need to
continually accumulate capital implies the need for the capitalist economy to
continually expand geographically.34 To grow requires taking up new space, or
reconfiguring old spaces.35 Both processes - absolute growth in new spaces and
relative geographical expansion as old spaces are reconfigured - have been and are
u HARVEY, THE LIMITS To CAPITAL, supra note 22; DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF
POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1990); DAVID
HARVEY, THE URBAN EXPERIENCE (1989).
29 See, e.g., EDwARD L. AYERS ET. AL., ALL OVER THE MAP: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
SECTIONALISM (1996).
30 See, e.g., Erik Swyngedouw, Authoritarian Governance, Power, and the Politics of
Rescaling, 18 ENV'T& PLAN. D: SOC'Y & SPACE 63, 64-66 (2000).
3 1Weiner, supra, note 1, at 4.4; Nevins, supra, note 13.
32. See, e.g., AIUUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBALIZATION (1996)X DON MITCHELL, CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(2000).
33 MARx, supra, note 6, at 667-70.
3 See HARVEY, THE LIMITS TO CAPITAL, supra note 22; SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 14; see also HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE SURVIVAL OF CAPITALISM (1976); see also
MICHAEL STORPER& RICHARDWALKER, THE CAPITALIST IMPERATIVE (1989).
35See LEFEBVRE, supra note 34.
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important. Both are related to the expansion not just of capitalism in general, but of
capitalist value in particular. 6
During the period of active colonial expansion, absolute geographical growth
was made possible through the opening of new swaths of land: the Americas, Asia,a d 37
and Africa. Over the course of several centuries, California transformed itself from a
remarkably varied and diverse series of Native American homelands into one of the
premier regions of capitalist development and innovation. This transformation is as
good of an example of this process of absolute expansion as one could want (as Marx
recognized),31 - even if this transformation could only be accomplished by California
continuing to import new laborers39 Nonetheless, by the end of the nineteenth
century, politicians and theorists from across the political spectrum - from the
colonialist apologist Halford Mackinder in Britain to V. Lenin in exile in Vienna -
began to realize that the absolute expansion of capitalism in geographical space was
no longer possible.4 The end of colonialist expansion was at hand and some argued
this inability for capitalism to continue to expand absolutely would lead to a period of
constant crisis resulting eventually in capitalisnis demise.4 1
Clearly this did not happen (despite the ever deepening crises that faced the
capitalist economy over the course of the twentieth century). The question then is
what accounts for what the French theorist Henri Lefebvre referred to as the "survival
of capitalism. 42 One answer to that question has been that continued expansion -
continued accumulation - has been affected through the production and reproduction
of relative geographical space. 43
Relative geographical space can be defined as the relationship between places
and landscapes, but in order for it to be so defined, we need to examine the differences
between spaces that allow them to be related.44 Difference for example, between
farmworkers' housing and suburban California housing development,4 is in part a
result of the drive for relative surplus value under capitalism. Relative surplus value
derives from two processes. On the one hand, relative surplus value can be created
when the overall value of labor power falls, often because of a rise ofproductivity, but
also through the socialization of the laborers' own reproduction costs. As David
Harvey notes, capturing this form of relative surplus value is a highly ephemeral
business, and if it is to be systematized then it requires a "class strategy of some sort
(subsidies on basic commodities, cheap food, and housing policies, etc.)."" Thinking
36- See HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL, supra note 22.
37- SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 140; HARVEY, THE LIMITS TO CAPITAL,
supra note 22, at 413-415.
38. McWLLIAMS, supra note 5, at 56; see also Walker, supra note 5.39- See DANIEL, supra note 4; see also Fuller, supra note 11.
40. See SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14.
41. See ROSA LUXEMBURG, THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL (1968).
42 - LEFEBVRE, THE SURVIVAL OF CAPITALISM, supra note 34.
43 See HARVEY,THE LimTs ToCAPITAL, supra note 22; see also LEFEBVRE, PRODUCTION OF
SPACE, supra note 35; see also SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14.
44- See supra notes 13-21.
41. Don Mitchell, California Living, California Dying: The Political Economy of
Landscape, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY (forthcoming).
46"- HARVEY, THE Lmrrs To CAPITAL, supra note 22, at 31.
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in terms of geographical scale, the geographical implications ofthis strategy are clear.
Nationalist production and labor policies have often been geared toward assisting
national capitals in capturing precisely this form of relative surplus value in the global
commodity markets through state subsidies for housing, staple foods, transportation,
etc.
As financial and production capital burst the bounds of the nation-state, so
global markets in these were forged, then new forms of "leveling the playing field" in
terms of labor subsidation were demanded - demands that organizations like the IMF
and trade agreements like NAFTA and the FTAA have risen to meet. These demands
are often contradictory. For example, as corporations have sought to protect their fixed
investment in established production facilities, they have at the same time been taking
advantage of the cheaper, and often subsidized labor elsewhere, while the organized
workers and other social groups have fought to retain vestiges of state support for
housing, wages, etc. In part, the structural adjustment programs of the IMF can be
seen as attempts to impose a new set of rules for capturing this form of surplus value
at a global scale. Those IMF rules and programs that we have come to call "structural
adjustment," together with the "Washington Consensus,' or what Daniel Singer (1999)
called "American Plan" capitalism,47 helped advance, intentionally or not, a further,
often more brutal "class strategy" for capturing relative surplus value, such as the
elimination of welfare and other working class subsidies in specific geographical areas
(the American and European inner city, the countryside of a developing country for
example), together with the development of new fetters on union activity, drives down
wages by creating a labor surplus, by making poverty a natural feature of the
landscape, or, by undermining workers' own collective power.4
The second form of relative surplus value is more "local." Again, Harvey
explains the process well. Individual capitals, he notes:
can leverage the gap between socially necessary labour time and
their own private costs of production. Capitalists employing
superior production techniques and with higher than average
productivity of labour can gain an excess profit by trading at a price
set by the social average when their production costs per unit are
well below the social average.49
As Harvey goes on to note, this form of relative surplus value is even more ephemeral
than the other because the competitive drive in capitalism, the necessary drive to
continue to profit, to accumulate surplus value, "forces other producers to catch up or
go out ofbusiness.50 The competitive race for productivity, then, leads to a constant
pressure to depress exchange values - the very means by which surplus value is
realized. The only way to profit from this contradiction is to meet it on its own terms
and to continually seek ways to depress the real cost of labor - through both a real and
an effective decline in wages.,"
47- DANIEL SINGER, W HOSE M ILLENNIUM? THEIRS OR OURS? (1999).
48. See, e.g., JAMIE PECK, W ORKFARE STATES (2001); Frances Piven & Richard Cloward,
REGULATING THE POOR (1992).
49- HARVEY, THE LIMITS TOCAPITAL, supra note 22, at 33.
50.Id.
51-Id.
[Vol 2".2
THE GEOGRAPHY OF INJUSTICE
The roots of both intra- and inter-class conflict within this form of relative
surplus value production are clear. Capitals compete with each other to capture relative
surplus value, if not exactly in a zero-sum game, then at least in a game that does have
winners and losers. Meanwhile, these same capitals both individually and collectively
compete with laborers who seek to raise their own wages - to capture more of the
surplus value being produced. But the interesting issue is the changing geography of
this process. As Neil Smith explains, the more capitalism develops, "the more it relies
upon the appropriation of relative [rather than absolute] surplus value."12 In Mars
words, over time, a point has been reached in capitalisnls history in "which the
development of the productivity of social labour becomes the most powerful lever of
accumulation" - that is relative surplus value dominates over absolute surplus value. 3
This development of productivity of labor, interestingly, is in large part a
function of an investment in fixed capital.4 Fixed capital is that portion of capital
immobilized in the "things" that make production possible - machines, factories,
houses, roads, communication systems, fields, etc. - some of which are collectively
provided for, others of which are developed by individual capitals, and still others of
which are left to the devices of working people.55 To the degree that "globalization"
leads to a greater overall productivity of labor, then it does so, to some large degree,
through a continued investment in fixed capital. Some of this fixed capital is,
necessarily, fixed in place, that is, completely immobile.56 In Smith's wonderful phrase,
"ifrelative surplus value [is] the most powerful lever of accumulation, then fixed capital
is the pivot upon which this lever gains its power."5 7 In essence, capitalism now
develops by exploiting geographical differences in the endowment of fixed capital. 58
These differences are relative geographical space. And here the differences in markets
for commodity, finance, and productive capital take on new importance, for the kinds
of fixed capital important to each are varied and often contradictory, and the ways in
which capital circulates through the landscapes that fixed capital defines is enormously
complex.59 Following Smith, and building on this notion of complexity, we can begin
to see that the geographical patterns that define the worlds we live in are the product
52- SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 89.
53-Id. (quoting MARX, GUNDRISSE 769 (1973)).
54- See, e.g., HARVEY, THE LITrs TO CAPITAL, supra note 22, at 204-238; Don Mitchell,
Landscape and Surplus Value: The Making of the Ordinary in Brentwood, California,
12 ENv'r & PLAN. D: Soc'Y & SPACE 7, 30 (1994).
55- HARVEY, THE LIMITS ToCAPiTAL, supra note 22; Labor, Capital and Class Struggle
Around the Built Environment in Advanced Capitalist Societies, 6 POL. & Soc'Y 265
(1977).
56- See GEORGEHENDERSON, CALUFORNIA AND THE FICTIONS OF CAPITAL 28 (1999) (for an
excellent argument on seeing capitalism as a series of (structured) problems that
individual capitalists need to overcome).
s. SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 89.
58- HARVEY, THE LIMITs To CAPITAL, supra note 22, at 208-223 (A further implication of
capital's reliance on fixed infrastructure is that that infrastructure often becomes a fetter
rather than an aid to accumulation - as with outdated factories, outmoded
transportation systems, inappropriate housing stock, and so forth).
59- d.at 223-38.
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of contradictory tendencies: first, the more that social development emancipates space
from society, the more important does spatial fixity become; second, and foremost, the
tendencies towards differentiation and universalization, or equalization, emanate side
by side in the belly of capitalism.'
They do so at a multitude of geographical scales ranging for the bodies of
working people to the neighborhoods and villages they live in, to the urban centers
that concentrate and accumulate finance capital, to the space of the nation with its
borders and laws and regulatory apparatuses. 1 Difference and equalization, or at least
some dialectic between these, is endemic in every cell, pore, and social body that
capitalism produces. 62 Relative geographical space is the engine of relative surplus
value production and hence the very means by which the capitalist economy can
continue to move.63 To eliminate difference under the guise of globalization would be
to eliminate capitalism. Therefore, any agreements about how trade in commodity,
finance and production capital is to be organized must effectively preserve, rather than
destroy, difference, even if such a preservation is not written directly into the language
of the agreements.
But there are other reasons why difference (inequality) must be preserved.
These other reasons also center on the importance of relative surplus value to the
continued growth of capitalism. Surplus value originates in the difference between the
time a laborer works to repay the value of her or his own labor-power, and the total time
a laborer works." InMares terms absolute surplus value derives from lengthening the
working day.65 Relative surplus value derives from changing the ratio oftime worked
to repay the value of labor power, and time spent producing surplus value."6 We have
already seen that that ratio results in part from the productivity of labor. It also results,
of course, from driving down the cost of labor power.67 That is, employers have a
vested interest in continuing to lower the real cost oftheir labor. In more formal terms,
they have a vested interest in lowering the cost of the social reproduction of laborers.
As Marx argues, the reproduction of the working class is a precondition for
the reproduction of capital.6 Laborers must eat, drink, have time to relax, sleep, and
have shelter. All of these are part of the cost (and value) of labor power. "In
contradistinction ... to the case of other commodities," as Marx spells out the obvious
point, "there enters into the determination of the value oflabour-power a historical and
moral element: 9 If the historical development of a place, the geography of the capital
fixed in place, demands that workers travel to and from work by car rather than on foot,
then the costs of such travel must be figured into the cost of labor (workers wages).
60. SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 90.
61. Don Mitchell, The Devil's Arm: Points of Passage, Networks of Violence and the
Political Economy of Landscape, 43 NEW FORMATIONS 44-60 (2001) (hereinafter Mitchell,
The Devil's Arm).
62. See HENDERSON, supra note 26.
63. See SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14.
64MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 6, at 207.
65 Id. at 299.
66-Id.
67. Id. at 303.
61. Id. at 537.
69 Id. at 168.
[Vol 2:2
THE GEOGRAPHY OF INJUSTICE
If single-family homes are part of the"historical and morar' expectations ofthe working
class, then the costs of these too, must somehow be figured into the costs of wages.
By contrast, if the historical standard in a specific location is tar-paper shacks, a cheap
diet of grains giving only a few calories over 2000, and no expectation of medical care,
then wages can be much lower.7 0 One of the signal features of capitalist uneven
development has been not just the exploitation of these differences, but their
development and maintenance, for they are exactly what allows for relative surplus
value to continue to be produced.7 1
The reproduction of the working class is indeed a precondition of the
reproduction of capital, but exactly how, and where the working class is reproduced
is always a result of social struggle and development. This question returns us to the
fields of California and the border with Mexico. A border that seems to be doing
anything but fading away as the economies of the Americas restructure in the image
of "free trade." By focusing on the geography of laborers, we can begin to understand
just why, in an era of free trade, borders are becoming more not less important.72 To
put that another way, the processes we call "globalization" can better be understood
as a reconfiguration of the relative geographical spaces that comprise the globe, and
as a reconfiguration of geographical scale, such that relative surplus value can
continue to be produced and captured in a world defined by a radically changed
geography of production. 73 Therefore, let's return to the fields of California, and to the
border that makes capitalist production in those fields not only competitive, but
possible.
!iL The Geography of Capitalist Labor Reproduction in an Era of 'Free
Traden
A. Still Factories in the Fields
Carey McWilliams wrote in 1949, seven years after the bracero guest worker
program had been implemented, that"[o]ne can travel the length of the San Joaquin
Valley, at the height of the season, on the main highway...without being aware of the
fact that tens of thousands of workers, an army of 200,000, are somewhere camped,
somewhere at work."74 McWilliams' estimate of the number of farmworkers in California
was most likely a significant underestimate. However, it does say something about the
geography of California agricultural labor, namely that the worlds within which this
labor is reproduced are largely hidden, though often in plain sight?.7 While much of the
army of laborers who work the California fields are still fairly well hidden from our
everyday view, the important point is that that army has grown.7 6 At the same time,
California agricultural work has grown more intensely seasonal, making the insecurity
70. HARVEY, THE LIms ToCAPITAL, supra note 22, at 383; see also Mitchell, Landscape
and Surplus Value, supra note 54.
71- See SAMiRAMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (1976); see also MASSEY, supra note 19; see
also Smith, Uneven Development, supra note 14.
72. See ANDREAS, supra note 13; see also Nevins, supra note 13.
73- See Smith, The Restructuring of Spatial Scale, supra note 14.
74- CAREY MCWILLIAMS, CALIFORNIA: THE GREAT EXCEPTION 169 (1976 ed.).
7- Id.; see also MITCHELL, THE LIE OF THE LAND, supra note 12.
76. ALICIA BUGARIN & ELIAS LOPEZ, FARMWORKERS IN CALIFORNIA (1998) [hereinafter
BUGARIN, FAmWORKERs].
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of farmwork in California greater."7 Throughout 1990s, the agricultural economy in
California demanded some 800,000 to 900,000 laborers each year. Nevertheless these
workers filled the equivalent of only 300,000 to 350,000 year-round jobs, according to
the agricultural economist Philip Martin.'8 Seasonal labor demand grew by over 20%
in the 1980s and 1990S.79 In 1989, three years after the 1986 amnesty program and
twenty-five years after the bracero program had ended, perhaps 7% of all California
farmworkers were undocumented aliens. By 1995, official counts, which are always
underestimated, suggested that the percentage had increased to thirty-seven. While
Latin Americans comprise only 40% of the undocumented aliens in the US, 90% of
those detained as illegal are Mexican.80
Simultaneously, the legal structure of California agriculture has been radically
transformed.81 New share cropping systems have been implemented in crops like
strawberries. These systems shift the risks associated with production and harvesting
to the most marginal of farmers, themselves often only recently "settled out" from the
migratory labor stream.82
Elsewhere, new labor contracting systems have been developed that shift the
burden of compliance to laws governing wages, work conditions, health, safety, and
farmworker housing, from farm owners to some 155,000 subcontractors. Under state
and federal laws, these subcontractors, and not necessarily the 77,000 farms that they
work on, are the official "site" of employment and the subcontractors are the official
employers. In a typical year, only about 1/5 of 1% of these 155,000 subcontracting
"employers" are inspected.83 Indeed, between 1993 (before NAFTA and Operation
Gatekeeper) and 1997 (three years after the implementation of these), the number of
inspections of agricultural workplaces declined 30% (647 to 455); and citations for child
labor and worke s compensation violation both declined by about 75% (153 to 39 and
99 to 26, respectively). Total criminal citations for violations of agricultural workplace
and living place laws declined from 144 to 15 (90%), and civil citations declined from
282 to 130 (54%).'- While pay-related citations increased by more than 100%, the
number (from 30 to 65) is still quite small. Over the period, penalties assessed against
growers and contractors declined more than 60% (from $1,603,400 to $631,200).6
77 See Mitchell, The Devil's Arm, supra note 61 (this section is based on, and develops,
arguments laid out in note 61); see also Mitchell, California Living, supra note 45.
78. Cited in BUGARiN, FARmwORxERS, supra note 76, at 9.
79-Id.at 7.
8 Carol Nagengast, Militarizing the Border Patrol, 32 NACLA REp. ON Am. 37, 40
(1998).
91.BUGARIN, FARMWORKERS, supra note 76.
82. MIRIAM J. WELLS, STRAWBERRY FIELDS: POLITICS, CLASS AND WORK IN CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURE (1996).
83. See BUGARIN, FARmWORKERS, supra note 76, at 21; See also Fred Krissman, Farm
Labor Contractors: The Processors of New Immigrant Labor from Mexico for
California Agribusiness, 12 AcGIc. & HUM. VALUES 18-46 (1995); see also Dawn
Thilmany & Philip L. Martin, Farm Labor Contractors Play New Roles in Agriculture,
49 CAL. AGRIC., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 5:37-40.
14- BUGARIN, FARMwORKERS, supra note 76, at 19.
' Id.
86. Id.
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However, the proportion of penalties collected to those assessed improved, even if
actual dollar amounts are minuscule (considering that agriculture is more than a $25
billion a year industry): in 1993, only 9/0 of assessed penalties were collected ($142,302)
while in 1997 that had improved to 19% ($122,376).87 During this same period, while the
number of field sanitation inspections varied greatly (from a high of 592 in 1994 to a low
of 190 in the first three quarters of 1997), the rate of non-compliance to sanitation laws
remained steady, at about 60%."8 As we will see infra, all these numbers continued
to decline to new lows in the year 2000 that make California's policing of labor
conditions in the fields in the mid 1990s seem quite stringent.
With the growth of farm labor contractors, growers have shed responsibility
for housing workers. In 1955, there were some 9,000 registered employer-owned labor
camps in California. In 1998 there were 500.89 Workers sleep in barns and sheds, in
automobiles and trailers, on the open ground and in caves, in self-constructed shacks
and substandard apartments. 9 They have little access to safe drinking water and
sanitary toilets.91 In the fields, laws requiring water and toilets are rarely enforced,
leading to serious public health concerns not only for farmworkers, but also for the fruit
and vegetable eating public.92 Conditions for workers in California are every bit as bad
- and to some degree considerably worse - now as they were in 1913 when workers
rioted in a hops camp, which led to the writing of the first field and camp sanitation
laws;93 as they were in the late 1920s when communist unions found fertile fields for
organizing;9 as they were in the late 1930s when JohnSteinbeck (1936, 1939) andCarey
McWilliams (1939) did so much to expose them;" as they were in the 1950s when Cesar
87 Id.
g Id.
Id. at 23.
9'- Id.; William Langeweische, Invisible Men, THENEW YORKE 23 Feb.-2 Mar. 1998, at
141; see also Mitchell, supra note 61; see also WELLS, supra note 82.
91 See BUGARIN, FARMWORKERS, supra note 76.
91 Barbara Herries-Harthorn, California Farmworkers: Dilemmas in Developing
Interventions for Health and Medical Care Concerns, 57 Hum. ORG. 369 (1998); Ketty
Mobed et al., Occupational Health Problems Among Migrant and Seasonal
Farmworkers, 157 W.J. MED. 367 (1992); John R. Myers & David Hard, Work-related
Fatalities in the Agricultural Production and Services Sectors, 1980-1989, 27 AM.
J. INDUS. MED. (1995), at 51; NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON MIGRANT HEALTH, LOSING
GROUND: THE CONDITION OFFARMWORKERS IN AMEmCA, (Sept. 1995), at 7;see also WELLS,
supra note 82.
93- See DANIEL, supra note 5; see MITCHELL, THE LIE OF THE LAND, supra note 12. See
generally CARLETON H. PARKCER, THE CASUAL LABORER AND OTHER ESSAYS (1920).
94- See DANIEL, supra note 5; see MITCHELL, THE LIE OF THELAND, supra note 12.
9- See generally McWLLAMS, FACTORIES IN THE FIELD, supra note 5; see generally
MCWILLAMS, ILL FARES THE LAND (1942); see generally JOHN STEINBECK, GRAPES OF
WRATH (1939); see generally JOHN STEINBECK, THEIR BLOOD IS STRONG (1938); see
generally DEVRA W EBER, DARK SWEAT, W ITE GOLD. CALIFORNIA FARM W ORrRS, COTTON,
AND THE NEW DEAL (1994).
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Chavez began his long organizing campaigns; s and as they were in 1985 when
advocates for farmworkers found dozens of strawberry pickers living in caves etched
out of the hillsides near the amazingly productive California strawberry fields.97
The relatively few moments when conditions have improved in the fields have
been the direct result of labor militancy.98 Worker power, and not "trade," has been at
the root of any push towards decent living and working conditions in California."
Decline in working conditions can be mapped almost directly onto the waning of
worker power.10 With this in mind, President Fois argument about needing to
regulate migration across the border, and Alan Greenspan's frank admission about the
value of immigrants to the U.S. economy, coupled with the U.S. Ambassadors equally
frank admission that illegal aliens are critical to the U.S. economy, take on new
meaning.'O But to see why means turning our attention to the border itself, and form
there to gaze upon the spaces of social reproduction and the "historical and moral"
elements that define them under the banner of "free trade."
B. The Border
As Peter Andreas relates in his book, Border Games, one of the strategies of
the Clinton administration in its campaign to secure passage of NAFTA was to promise
a fortification ofthe U.S.-Mexico Border. 02 The Mexican government also adopted this
rhetoric. For some time, nativist groups along the border had been campaigning
against what they saw as an increasingly anarchic border that had become a major
conduit not only for illegal immigrants, but also for illegal drugs, and the Clinton
administration was convinced that it had to mollify the iativists (as well as less extreme
American nationalists).'0 3 In Andreas's words, "the result has been the construction
of both a borderless economy and a barricaded border."' 0 4 Or as the geographer
Joseph Nevins has argued the case, "the level of porosity of the boundary is a function
of the type of transnational flow crossing the intemationaldivide. 10' Capital and most
commodities have little trouble. The border is little more than a turnstile. Potential
migrants and some drugs, on the other hand, find the full weight of the state arrayed
against them. 106 The border serves as a fortified gate, and Operation Gatekeeper could
96- See generally ERNESTO GALARZA, FARM WORKERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA
1947-1960 (1977); see generally PETER MATrIESSEN, SAL SIPUEDES: CESAR CHAVEZ AND
THE NEW AMERiCAN REVOLUTION (1969).
97. WELLS, supra note 82, at 210-214.
98. See generally DANIEL, supra note 5; see generally J. TELHO & LINDA C. MAJIA, FARM
WORcERs, AGRIBUSINESS AND THE STATE (1982); see generally MCWILLIAMS, FACTORY IN
THE FIELDS, supra note 5; see generally MITCHELL, THE LIE OF THE LAND, supra note 12.
"- Fuller, supra note 11 (Indeed, as farmers in California have long admitted, it is only
by fully minimizing the costs of labor that they can sell their produce in distant
markets).
100. See BUcARIN, FARMWORKERS, supra note 76.
101. Weiner, supra note 1 at 4.1, 4.4 (refer also to accompanying text).
"- See generally ANDREAS, supra note 13.
103. Id. at 85-93.
104. Id.
0 5- NEvINs, supra note 13 at 178.
106. Id.
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not be better named. 107 The question that then arises concerns the effects for the
economy, and for the workers of this sort of simultaneous opening and fortification o
the border. That is, how does a fortified border function to regulate the movement o
peoples as well as goods, and to whose benefit?
Before Operation Gatekeeper was implemented in 1994, deaths of migrants
trying to cross along the California portion of the border averaged about 20 per year
In the years since, they have climbed to more than 100 per year.'01 Along the whole
of the border, there is an average of more than one migrant death a day. °9 As more an(
more parts of the border have been fortified, and as migrants are pushed further intc
the mountains and deserts, deaths have increased. While such deaths are not the
intent of policies like Gatekeeper, they are obviously its consequence." 0 Beyond the
obvious and direct cost in human life, Gatekeeper has increased other costs fo
migrants. The cost of crossing the border has drastically increased. The California
Rural Legal Assistance Foundation now estimates that the smuggling of migrants
across the order is now a $7-8 billion dollar business, and that the cost to individua
migrants has skyrocketed since 1994."
One of Gatekeeper's specific aims is to stopmigrant-smuggling."2 With this
the risks associated with smuggling have drastically increased and smugglers -
coyotes - now take greater chances, putting their charges at risk, and have become
more violent than they were before Gatekeeper." 3 They have passed the increased
costs of doing business to those they are smuggling. The effect has been an increas(
in indentured servitude as labor sub-contractors exercise a form of debt-peonage while
migrants attempt to pay off their debts." 4 Such indentured undocumented workers are
doubly powerless: powerless to leave their jobs and powerless to report their
107. V. Robinson, The Social Legitimation of State Violence: Stigmatization of Migrant
Workers and the Homeless in the United States (unpublished paper, Department ol
Geography, Rutgers University).
108- Ken Ellingwood, Data on Border Arrests Raise Gatekeeper Debate, L.A. TIMES, Oct
1, 1999, at A3; Gregory A. Gross, 5-Year-Old Gatekeeper Is Praised, Denounced, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRMUNE, Oct. 31, 1999, at B1; Claudia Smith, Condemning Migrant Job
Seekers To Death, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 6, 1999, at B7; see NEVINS, supra
note 13.
109- Leonel Sanchez, Activist Urges More Humane Border Strategy; Immigrant Deaths
On Rise Since '94, SAN DEIGO UNION-TRm., Feb. 15, 2001, at B3 (noting that the INS
reported some 391 deaths on the U.S. side of the border in 2000. The Mexican Foreign
Ministry, which tries to count crossing-related deaths on both sides of the border,
reported 499 deaths in 2000 and more than 1500 since Gatekeeper went into effect).
1"0 See NEVINS, supra note 13.
1' See Gross, supra note 108.
112. See ANDREAS, supra note 13; see also NEVINS, supra note 13.
113. See ANDREAS, supra note 13; see NEvINs, supra note 13; see also Ellingwood, supra
note 108; see also Michael Huspek, Border Violence: Implicating Operation
Gatekeeper, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-Tam., Aug. 27 1997, at B5.
114. DANIEL ROTHENBERG, WITH THESE HANDS: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF MIGRANT
FARMWORYERS TODAY (1998); see Langerweische, supra note 90.
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conditions."' Workers not held in perpetual debt still face a high degree of
powerlessness, since their illegal status makes it exceedingly difficult to report labor,
housing, health or other abuses.1 6 In particular, the cost of deportation has
dramatically increased because of Gatekeeper, making workers reluctant to expose
themselves to that threat, thereby decreasing their power even further.
The fortification of the border has had a documented negative effect on the
willingness of migrant workers - both documented and undocumented- to participate
in union organizing and, for that matter, to avail themselves of all manner of
government programs. 17 As one study has shown, "nearly all the undocumented hired
farmworkers are fearful of interacting with government officials: they refrain from
reporting occupational injuries to government agencies and do not seek medical
assistance from government-supported service providers.""' The economic advantage
to growers and other businesses that rely on undocumented labor is obvious. Real
wages in some crops dropped by more than 40% during the 1980s and 1990s," 9 and
they continue to fall.' 20 While not all of this decline can be attributed to changes along
the border, the majority of it can. The border has served to lower the cost of the
reproduction of labor power by helping to ensure the immiseration of a whole class of
working people made powerless to confront their conditions.
The implementation of a regulated "guest worker" program to see workers
across the border will not change matters much, if the current small-scale programs are
any indication.'2 ' Guest worker programs may serve to further fortify or otherwise
"make safe" the border - or at least help give that appearance - but they will do little
to redress the fundamental power differential that exists between capital and labor as
it circulates across that border. Guest workers are tied to specific employers. If they
are fired or the job ends, they are immediately made "illegal." The case of 29 quarry
workers in Boulder County, Colorado is indicative. '22 A quarry owner recruited these
workers in Quaretaro state, Mexico, on the promise of $10 an hourjobs. They entered
the country legally on H2B temporary work visas. After housing the workers in squalid
conditions, and then failing to pay them what he had agreed, the quarry owner fired the
workers. Since the visa was tied to employment at the quarry, the workers were
instantly "illegal." ' 3 While the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could
115- Josiah M. Heyman, State Effects on Labor Exploitation: The INS and
Undocumented Immigrants at the Mexico-United States Border, 18 CERTIQUE OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 157 (1998).116. id.
117- Id.; see NEVINs, supra note 13.18-See Herries-Hathorn, supra note 92; see also Mitchell, California Living, supra
note 45.
119. See WELLS, supra note 82.
'20- See infra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
121. The history of the bracero program is a guide. It was exactly that program, after all,
the Cesar Chavez and the United Farmworkers understood had to be eliminated if
farmworkers unionizing was to be successful.
'2. Michael Janofsky, Dismissed Immigrants Say the System Betrayed Them, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2,2001, at 1:24.123. id.
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renew or extend their visas, it would only do so if the workers secured another
sponsoring employer. The effect is, in essence, a form of bonded servitude.
While both advocates and critics of guest worker programs say that such
perfidious behavior by employers is not the norm, the program nonetheless places a
great deal of power in employers' hands. For its part, the INS says that it does not keep
track of guest workers who lose their jobs,'24 seemingly expressing little interest in such
abuses of the guest worker program. The lack of enforcement of employer sanctions
for using undocumented labor is well known, as is the willingness of INS agents to raid
workplaces during organizing drives.12
The point is that the border as it now exists: a fortified, heavily policed fence
that pushes migrants into the deserts and mountains, and that plays such an important
role in both lowering wages and undermining worker power in the U.S., is the exact
geographical representation of the importance of geographical difference to continued
capitalist development under the regime of free trade. 126 The border reifies difference
and makes it available as an input to profit. It helps reproducethe very differences that
are leading so many migrants north and across the border. To undermine the border,
to open it up to the free movement of workers, to allow workers the same freedoms and
rights that are now being given capital, would simultaneously undermine U.S.
production.'2 7 As the U.S. ambassador to Mexico so candidly admitted, both
agricultural and service (and indeed many other) industries are simply impossible in the
U.S. without illegal labor.12
Strengthening the fortification of the border for workers seeking employment
within the U.S. has the effect- whether intended or not does not matter - of driving
down wages directly, and of driving down the cost to employers of doing business.
As neo-classical economic models suggest, under a regime of unlimited labor
movement, and given equal rights within the resulting market, labor rates would tend
124. id.
12'- See, e.g., Nurith C. Aizenman, INS Raids Follow Union Organizing; Aliens Say Law
Is Being Misused, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1999, at A3; Heyman, supra note 115
(membership in the United Farmworkers has fallen to about 27,000 from a high of near
100,000 in the 1970s);see Andy Furillo, With Union in Decline, Farm Workers Turning
Elsewhere, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 22, 2001.
126- See NEvINs, supra note 13.
127- As participants at the University of Richmond Law School Symposium noted, at
which this argument was presented, simply opening the border, might, in fact, have the
effect of further lowering wages. But free trade areas are based on the equalization of
rights for capital and investors. Extending these same rights, that is truly dismantling
the border for people, would, over time, undermine precisely the sort of differential
advantages that capital seeks to exploit through compacts like NAFTA and FTAA.
The point of my argument is that it will be impossible to open the border in anything
like aj ust manner because the geographical differences in rights that the border reifies
are crucial to the geography of relative surplus value production. It is also a (partial)
solution to the contradiction of over-production: to the degree that wages are lowered
for some (e.g. migrant workers), they may be maintained at higher real levels for others,
who are then "freed" to consume, which, of course, is critical, since surplus value is
such only to the degree that it is realized in exchange..
123. Weiner, supra note 2, at 4.1.
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towards equilibrium across space. Closing and fortifying the border assures that this
equilibrium is never reached, while also assuring that enough workers are nonetheless
on hand, and in so thoroughly a powerless condition to guarantee that localized wage
rates will also not rise too high. Immiseration is a crucial function of the border.
Keeping the border closed to workers, and thus reifying differences in rights across a
single labor market, assists in the externalization of the reproduction costs of labor by
helping to create a thoroughly uneven geography of production.
C. Looking South, Moving North
To say that much does not say anything about either where the costs of
reproduction are borne, or why so many people keep attempting to cross the border,
no matter how fortified it becomes. The answer to the second question, of course, is
obvious: they are looking for work. They are drawn to the border to work in
Maquiladoras, they are drawn to northern Mexican agribusinesses (many of them U.S.-
based), and, especially, they are drawn across the border to work in services,
manufacturing, and agriculture. But, this only raises the further question of why so
many people are on the move; why so many are willing to risk their lives and to pay
exorbitant costs to cross the border; why so many will rip themselves away from their
families - their children and their spouses, their parents and their communities - and
risk not seeing them for years (if ever again).
Part of the answer is implicit in our earlier discussion ofuneven development.
Radical differences in the "historical and moral elements" that govern social
reproduction - and so the cost of labor - set up what demographers call a series of.push" and "pull" factors, and people have been responding to these for generations.1
By moving, they can both improve their lot and offer their labor at a cut rate in the new
location.
As we know, "historical and moral elements" are not simply a natural feature
of the landscape. Sometimes they are a matter of law. In preparation for the
implementation of NAFTA, Mexican President Salinas engineered a repeal of Section
X of Article 27 of Mexicds Constitution. This section guaranteed communal rights to
land. Its repeal allowed for lands to be mortgaged, sold off, privatized, and
engrossed.1 30 The repeal of Section X has paved the way for a new and, as ever, quite
vicious, round of primitive accumulation- 3 ' The result was the displacement of
hundreds of campesinos, most of whom are indigenous peoples. Cultivated acreage
in Mexico dropped 37% between 1994, the year ofNAFTA's implementation, and 1998.
As John Ross has written, campesinos are becoming minimum wage workers on what
were once their own lands 32 Their control over the means of production, to put it in
crude terms, has been alienated from them, and like Europe's peasants at the end of
'29- See, e.g., POPULATION MIGRATIO1 AND THECHANGING WORLD ORDER (W.T.S. Gould &
A.M. Findlay eds., 1994); DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS OF THEU.S.-MExICo BORDER (John R.
Weeks & Roberto Ham-Chande eds., 1992) (for recent work by geographers on
population mobility and economic change).
-.See id. (for analysis).
131- MARX, supra note 6, at 667-724.
132. John Ross, The Burro at the Palace, 62 THE PROGRESSIVE (1998) 9:28-29 (referring to
minimum wage in Mexican terms, of course - a wage that plummeted in the wake of the
massive devaluation of the peso in 1995).
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feudalism, they have become "free labor" - free of everything but their labor power. 133
Campesinos are now free to move north to the burgeoning industrial farms of Baja and
Sonora, the bustling, if wholly degrading, Maquila districts, and of course the U.S.
Reporters for the New Yorker have had no trouble turning up indentured Zapotec
peasants living in converted chicken sheds on flower farms in San Diego and Riverside,
and their even less fortunate compatriots living without shelter in the ravines below
Southern California's sprawling, faux-Spanish suburbs.'34
The migration expert Douglas Massey notes that "as subsistence, command,
or bureaucratic economic structures are replaced with market mechanisms [as is
NAFTA's intent], workers are displaced from their former livelihood and thrown onto
uncertain labor markets."13' These "market mechanisms" as Massey notes, are not
somehow natural and objective, but constructed. Beginning in 1982, the Mexican
government embarked on a program of IMF and World Bank directed neoliberal
economic restructuring. As Massey details, this restructuring entailed abandoning the
import-substitution model that had governed Mexican development to that point, and
replacing it with a regime of export-oriented production, lowered and eliminating tariffs,
creating new rules to encourage outside investment and foreign business ownership,
and abandoninglongstanding welfare programs.' 36 Encoding such changes in NAFTA
created "a direct U.S. financial and political interest in Mexico's free market reforms, and
any Mexican president who acted unilaterally against U.S. financial and political
interests could expect to pay a very high price at home and abroad."137 Massey is
worth quoting at length here:
In ratifying NAFTA, therefore, the United States was
ratifying the free market economic model that President Salinas had
implemented in Mexico; and if one approves of that economic
model, then logically one also approves of the transformations that
follow from it. In urban areas, workers have been shed in record
numbers from government bureaucracies, state-owned firms, and
private companies. In rural areas, privatization has brought a wave
of land consolidation, mechanization, and a shift to capital-intensive
production methods, all of which have worked to displace
subsistence farmers and small landowners. As unemployment has
risen and inflation has oscillated between extremes over the past
decade, Mexicans have sought ways of managing risk.131
One means of managing this risk has been to send one or more household
members north to risk crossing the border in search of work. "The consolidation of
Mexican markets under NAFTA, in short, unleashed precisely the sort of social,
political, and economic transformations that have served as engines of international
133. See MARx, supra note 6.
'34. See Langewiesche, supra note 90.
115. Douglas S. Massey, March of Folly: U.S. Immigration Policy after NAFTA, 37 AM.
PROSPECT 22 (1998), available at http://www.prospect.org/printV9/37/massey-d.html
at 8.1-'/ d. at 115.
13 7 id. at 16.
131- Id. at 17.
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migration elsewhere in the world.' 39 . In short, neo-liberal development is not a"solution" to international migration, but its cause.140
Massey convincingly argues that first, NAFTA-type development will only
continue to increase flows of migration, migration that is more permanent than
temporary. Second, Massey convincingly argues that current U.S. immigration policy,
as implemented through Gatekeeper and similar programs, will do little more than
encourage "stagnant wages, declining labor standards, and a growing population of
impoverished, unhealthy, and poorly educated Mexican Americans."'4' In a study
conducted with a colleague, Massey showed that, before the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), undocumented Mexican migrants earned the same wages
as those with documents. However, after IRCA, undocumented Mexican migrants
earned 28% less than those with documents, and "the post-IRCA wage penalties were
especially severe in agriculture and among migrants hired through subcontractors. " '42
But, this is not to say that ICRA has been effective in its stated aims. Rather, the
employer sanctions associated with IRCA have done little more than create "a new
black market for immigrant labor."1 43
Massey argues that the net effect of agreements like NAFTA and stepped up
border fortification through IRCA-like laws and Operation Gatekeeper-like programs of
enforcement is a policy that is "backfiring."' 44 On the contrary, such a policy is deeply
profitable. It is, in fact, making profitability possible through the exploitation and
enforcement of differences in citizenship, in access to land, in wealth, in realistic
desires, and of whole new fields for the accumulation of capital. It is creating a classic
reserve army of laborJ 45 in California and elsewhere in the U.S. that allows, as Alan
Greenspan so frankly admitted,'4 vibrant economic growth without a rise in real wages
for most workers, commonly known as inflation.47 This is in large part because
Mexico, and not California, is the location for the reproduction of California
agriculture's labor force, and the stark differences between the "historical and moral
elements" between the two places, as degraded as California's conditions are
becoming, are precisely the means by which relative surplus value is leveraged. Taken
together, the upheavals of NAFTA-like neo-liberal reform and an increased
' 3 9 Id. at 18.
140- Id. at 5.
141. id.
142 id. at 46.
' 4 3 Id. at 1 47.
'44"Id. at 5.
4. MARX, supra note 6, at 602-603.
146- Wiener, supra note 1, at 12.
'47- See Doug Henwood, Income & Poverty, 80 LEFr Bus. OBSERVER (Nov. 1997)
(showing real wages have declined for poor and middle income Americans by 3.2% and
3.0 % respectively between 1989 and 1996) available at
http://www.panix.com/-dhenwood/Statsincpovhtml. See also Doug Henwood, Boom
for Whom, 93 LEFT Bus. OBSERVER (Feb. 2000) (showing that real wages for middle
income Americans began to rise in 1997 and 1998, but had not yet regained value lost
in the earlier period), available at http://www.panix.com/-dhenwood/IncPov98.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2001).
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militarization of the U.S. bordeimake increased exploitation, that is increased surplus
value production, possible.
Uneven development, the growth of California agriculture through the
immiseration of workers both in California and to the south, is a precondition, rather
than a by-product, of globalization. There is no clearer evidence for this than the sheer
numbers of agricultural employers and subcontractors who avoid paying California's
minimum wage, and sometimes avoid paying workers altogether. A series of stories
published in the Sacramento Bee in May and June 2001 begin to hint at the scale of the
problem. A state study of vineyard employers showed that some 35% paid workers
below minimum wage in 1998.14 Failure to pay workers altogether was not rare.
However, not a single vineyard operator, nor the subcontractors that serve them, was
prosecuted for wage violations that year 49 Simultaneously, between 1996 and 1999,
while workplace deaths across the country were dropping, deaths of California
farmworkers increased by 33% (from 57 to 76 per year),?5 0 Official reports of pesticide
poisonings have decreased from highs in the 1980s, but anecdotal evidence from farm
area clinics suggest that exposure is far higher than official statistics indicate.'' It is
hard to determine realistic numbers, however.
As always, the State of California remains reluctant to enforce its own
agricultural safety, living and wage laws. Democratic Governor Gray Davis recently
vetoed a bill that would have put more teeth into California farm labor law by imposing
jail time for growers or contractors who knowingly violate labor laws.5 2 In an effort
that is nothing more than sickeningly symbolic, California now employs a total of 19
farm inspectors, who issued a total of only 87 citations in 2000. While these
inspectors assessed $530,000 in fines, they collected only $66,000.'m At the peak of the
2000 season, farms employed 509,000 people, which only accounted for between 50%
and 60% of the farmworkers resident in the state.'55 Such a huge surplus of labor
certainly implies its constant cheapening. But it also implies that the costs of
reproducing California's labor force are fully externalized from the point of production
- and placed either in the source region (Mexico and south), or onto what tattered
remains of the California public assistance system including public hospitals, food
banks, homeless shelters, etc. which may still exist.
IV. FTAA: Deepening the Geography of Injustice
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"- Andy Furillo, Farm Labor's Dangers Detailed, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 27, 2001, at
Al; see also http://www.cfbf.com/release/2001/pr-082401.htm (noting the California
Farm Bureau Federation states the decline in total U.S. workplace deaths on its website
while never mentioning the fact that California farmworker deaths are on the increase)
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152. Andy Furillo, Farm Labor Reforms Far From Certain, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 22,
2001, at Al.
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Into this environment comes the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.
President Bush, and before him President Clinton, described the FTAA as the
expansion of NAFTA to the whole of the hemisphere. While there are differences in
the details between the two agreements, it is clear that the intent is the same: an effort
by national elites, themselves driven by degrees of access to power, to implement a
hemispheric neo-liberal regime of trade that shifts power from people to property, from
workers to investors, and from campesinos to corporations. The effect will be to
produce yet more free labor. Such labor will consist of not only laborers who are free
to sell their labor because they have no other way to support themselves but also
laborers who must exercise this freedom under conditions of excruciatingly
straightened circumstances.
During the Quebec Summit of the Americas, President Bush spoke in ringing
tones about how with the FTAA:
[w]e seek freedom not only for people living within our borders, but
also for commerce moving across our borders. Free and open trade
creates new jobs and new income. It lifts the lives of all our people,
applying the power of markets to the needs of the poor. It spurs the
process of economic and legal reform. And open trade reinforces the
habit of liberty.1 6
In California, we can see the content of that freedom, the validity of those
laws, and just what it means to apply the power of the market to the needs of the poor.
Such cynicism on the part of those who tout the unending benefits of neo-liberal
reform, no matter how often we hear them, is hard to swallow. But the telling part is the
first sentence of Bush's statement. Freedom is for people living within our borders.
Freedom is also for goods that cross those same borders. Freedom does not extend,
however, to those people who cross borders in search of the work that their freedom
to sell their labor power demands and provides us with exactly the freedom President
Bush finds so attractive. Our good living is predicated on their continuing
iTmiseration.157 For them, there is Operation Gatekeeper; there is the non-enforcement
of labor laws; there is the continued intensification of seasonality in California farm
work, and the subsequent need for ever greater numbers of truly immiserated workers;
there is the direct attack on the power of organized labor. We know just what President
Bush means when he says that "I don't want labor protections to be used to destroy
the free trade agreement."'s8
The FTAA, like NAFTA, will not lift all into prosperity; it will deepen the
uneven development that makes capitalism possible by creating geographical discord
between markets for commodities and goods and for the reproduction of labor. To do
otherwise would undermine the very basis for trade. Strong borders and differential
treatment will remain the rule for workers. The new rules of cooperation and
competition for financial and productive capital at the global scale will demand at least
this much. The era of primitive accumulation - but now primitive accumulation in
relative geographical space - is not over.
156 David E. Sanger, Bush Links Trade with Democracy at Quebec Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2001, at 1.
Mitchell, supra note 45.
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